Abstract. Anonymous communication is a valuable but underused tool for securing financial communications. As early as the first commercial telegraph codes, businesses have recognized the value of cryptography to protect their communication from prying eyes. But cryptography alone still allows adversaries to discover confidential business relationships by performing traffic analysis to reveal the presence of such communication.
Introduction: Anonymity and Digital Commerce
In this paper, we argue that strongly anonymous (traffic analysis resistant) communications are valuable to the business and finance community, and we present Mixminion, an anonymous communication system in active development.
As early as when the first business-related telegrams were received by an untrusted telegraph operator, businesses have recognized the importance of encrypting messages on communications networks. Less well-recognized, however, is the importance of protecting business communications against traffic analysis.
Whenever data travels over public networks, an eavesdropper can usually link messages to their senders and receivers with little difficulty. Although this linkage might initially seem of little interest, there are many circumstances under which the volume of communication between two sites can reveal sensitive information. For example, linking senders and recipients can reveal:
-Whether (and how often) the CEO of a Fortune 500 corporation has been exchanging email with the CEO of a rumored buyout partner. -Which suppliers' websites a given purchaser is visiting.
-Which prospective customers a vendor has emailed and which of them responded via email. -In some digital cash designs, the volume and frequency of transactions between participants and between participants and banks.
When an organization is geographically distributed, its internal communications can become a target of traffic analysis. In this way, an eavesdropper may learn:
-Which locations have employees working late.
-Which locations have employees consulting job-hunting websites.
-Which research groups are communicating with a company's patent lawyers.
-What volume of communication an R&D group is exchanging with a production line.
While firewalls or virtual private networks can conceal a network's interior view, they do not provide any further privacy against traffic analysis attacks. These attacks are certainly feasible today. On the simplest level, corporate website administrators routinely survey logs to learn which competitors and customers have viewed which parts of their websites, and how often. The more sophisticated attacks are almost certainly within the capabilities of a nation able and inclined to use signals intelligence resources for economic goals, as the US has (probably) done with the NSA-backed ECHELON system. Finally, in between the threat of unsophisticated analysis and the threat of mid-sized foreign governments, is the potentially more compelling threat of espionage from competing companies. The risk of a competitor bribing an employee at a nearby telecom, or sneaking eavesdropping equipment into a colocation facility, is not well explored in the public literature.
Traffic analysis resistance is also a critical component to more advanced financial cryptography systems, such as anonymous digital cash schemes and private auctions: without anonymous transport, these schemes provide very little of the privacy that they promise.
Background
David Chaum launched the study of anonymous communications in 1981, with his design for a network of anonymizing servers or mixes [5] . In Chaum's design, message senders iteratively wrap their messages in the public keys of a sequence of mixes, then send the messages to the first mix in the sequence. Each mix in turn removes a layer of encryption from the messages, waits until enough messages have been received, then re-orders the messages and sends them to the next mix in the sequence. If any mix in the sequence correctly hides the correlation between incoming and outgoing messages, an eavesdropper should not be able to connect senders to recipients.
The first widespread public implementations of mixes were produced by contributors to the Cypherpunks mailing list. These "Type I" anonymous remailers were inspired both by the problems surrounding the anon.penet.fi service [10] , and by theoretical work on mixes. Hughes wrote the first Cypherpunk anonymous remailer [12] ; Finney followed closely with a collection of scripts that used Phil Zimmermann's PGP to encrypt remailed messages. Later, Cottrell implemented the Mixmaster system [11] , or "Type II" remailers, which added message padding, message pools, and other mix features lacking in the original Cypherpunk remailers. Unfortunately, Mixmaster does not support replies or anonymous recipients. Thus, people who need bidirectional anonymous communication must use the older and less secure Cypherpunk network.
In parallel with the evolution of mix nets for mail-like communication, other work has progressed on systems suitable for faster communication. These systems range from the simple centralized Anonymizer [2], to distributed sets of servers like Freedom [4] and Onion Routing [8] , to designs for totally decentralized peer-to-peer networks like Tarzan [9] and MorphMix [13] . But while these systems are more suitable than mixes for low-latency applications such as web browsing, chatting, and VoIP, they are more vulnerable to certain attacks than are traditional high-latency mix-net designs. Specifically, if an eavesdropper can observe both sides of the communication, the timing of message sending and delivery will quickly link senders and recipients. Although these systems block certain kinds of traffic analysis, they cannot defend against an adversary with significant eavesdropping abilities.
Mixminion: Open source strong anonymity
Mixminion is the reference implementation of the Type III mix-net, which was first designed between 2001 and 2002 to address weaknesses in Type II and also to reintroduce reply messages in a secure manner, thus allowing us to retire the (insecure) Type I network. Mixminion's design was first published in [7] ; its specification is publicly available [6] .
The Type III mix-net design improves on previously deployed designs:
-Secure single-use reply blocks, with indistinguishable replies. In order to prevent attacks on earlier systems in which multiple-use reply channels can be used to break anonymity, Type III supports only single-use reply channels. These replies are indistinguishable from forward messages to all parties except their senders and recipients. -Forward-secure, email-independent transfer protocol. Integration with mail transfer agents (such as Sendmail) has made earlier remailer networks fragile. Type III uses its own TLS-based transfer protocol to relay messages between mixes. The protocol is forward-secure: that is, future mix compromises cannot compromise past traffic recorded by an eavesdropper. -Integrated directory design. Earlier deployed mix-nets have left the issue of mix discovery to a set of unspecified, uncoordinated, out-of-band keyservers. Type III introduces synchronized directory servers to sign mix directories and avoid single-point-of-failure issues. -Integrated key rotation. Under Type I and Type II, key rotation occurs out of band, when a mix's administrator publicly announces a new key and tries to persuade other mixes and users to stop using the old key. This process can take weeks to months. Type III's key rotation is more practical: mixes publish new keys to directories so that clients can retrieve them automatically.
-Dummy traffic. Type III introduces a simple cover traffic design to complicate traffic analysis within the network.
The first public version of Mixminion was released in December of 2002. Since then, we have grown a deployed network of 22 testing servers, 1 operated by volunteers in the US, Canada, and Europe. (For comparison, the widely used Mixmaster network currently has about 30 working mixes.) The current codebase implements anonymous messages, anonymous replies, erasure-correcting fragmentation and reassembly, address blocking, reliable message delivery, and an automated server directory with key rotation.
Future work
Before Mixminion is ready for broad-scale user adoption, more work remains, both in research and in implementation. The largest areas ahead are, broadly:
-Usability and client implementation. For an anonymity system to hide its users' communications, it must have many users to hide them among: thus usability directly affects security [1, 3] . The current Mixminion client runs only from a command line on Unix-like platforms, though a Windows32 client is planned within the next few months. For maximum user acceptance, more work is needed to integrate Mixminion with existing email applications. -Distributed directory design. It is essential that all users of the Type III network have an identical view of which servers are available, reliable, and trustworthy. The current implementation uses a centralized directory, which gives the entire network a single point of failure. Our design calls for a more distributed directory implementation. -Pseudonymity. Currently, there is no practical way to maintain a longterm pseudonymous identity via Type III reply blocks. Although we have a specification for a workable pseudonym server, the server is not yet implemented. -Abuse prevention. One of the best ways to attack users' anonymity is by mounting a denial of service (DoS) attack against some or all of the Type III mix-net, in order to force users onto compromised servers, or to force them to use other (less secure) channels. At the same time, we need a way to let uninterested recipients opt out of anonymous mail, without letting them deny service to legitimate users. We need more research on how much impact these DoS opportunities can have on anonymity. -Enterprise integration. The current implementation, because of its volunteer roots, assumes that most installations are for a single computer. In an enterprise environment, however, it could be more reasonable to integrate a single Mixminion node as a part of the outgoing email server. This enclave firewall model allows the enterprise's security administrators to do their jobs while still protecting the company's activities from outside observers.
Beyond software development and research, much exploration remains within the broader financial cryptography community to discover appropriate applications and economic models for anonymous communication channels. Despite the potential applications of strong traffic analysis resistance in the business world, little effort has been spent in solving usability and scalability problems faced by these users.
There is reason for hope. The incentive structure of anonymity systems strongly argues against in-house measures to block traffic analysis: an organization using a "private" anonymity system cannot hide its traffic among traffic from other organizations. Thus, finance organizations that need to resist traffic analysis have an incentive to seek common solutions that not only meet their own needs, but that will attract as many users as possible. [1] The same reasoning gives non-business users an incentive to construct their systems to meet the needs of business and financial communities.
Mixminion aims to be the first deployed anonymous communication system that provides strong traffic analysis resistance, emphasizes usability, supports bidirectional communication, and can be sustained for the long term. These goals require more research on anonymity designs, more work on human/computer interaction and interfaces, and more awareness of the need for privacy around the world. We feel that pushing the envelope on all fronts and exploring the relationships between these requirements is the best way to bring the world closer to ubiquitous securable communications.
